Abstract-The copyright protection of 3D videos has become a crucial issue. In this study, a novel zero-watermark scheme with similarity-based retrieval is proposed. In our proposed scheme the features of both 2D-video and depth-map components are first extracted. Next, master shares and ownership shares are generated from these features and their relevant copyright information based on (2,2) visual secret sharing scheme. Different with traditional zero-watermark schemes, both the features and ownership shares are stored in relevant databases. When a 3D video is queried, a novel similarity-based retrieval phase is designed to obtain the ownership shares relevant to the particular 3D video. After that, the queried master shares are generated from this 3D video and stacked with its relevant ownership shares to identify its copyright ownership. To satisfy different DRM requirements of 3D videos, flexible mechanisms are designed for both similarity-based retrieval and copyright identification functions in our study. The experimental results demonstrate that RZW-SR3D not only obtains the ownership shares relevant to a particular 3D video precisely and reliably when processing numerous videos, which outperforms the traditional zerowatermark schemes, but also identifies the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components of 3D videos reliably, independently and simultaneously without any content distortion or watermarkembedding limitation, which outperforms existing 2D-video based and depth-map based watermark schemes for protecting 3D video.
I. INTRODUCTION
HE three-dimensional (3D) videos can provide better immersive experiences to viewers than traditional 2D videos and thus have been becoming popular over the Internet [1] [2] . At the same time, the risk of copyright infringement for 3D videos has also been increasing. In addition, the illegal copying and distribution of 3D videos will cause more serious losses to their owners than of 2D videos because the production costs of 3D videos are much higher. Therefore, protecting the copyrights of 3D videos has become a crucial issue. 3D videos can be stored in two major formats. One is stereo format, and the other is depth-image-based rendering (DIBR) based format [1] . The former contains the left and right views captured by several identical cameras at different positions for the same scene. The latter contains 2D videos along with their depth maps, and synthesizes the 3D videos by warping these frames based on DIBR technique. In this study, the DIBR-based format is chosen as the protection target due to the following two reasons. First, stereo videos stored in DIBR-based format can save storage and transmission-bandwidth because the depth maps, which mainly consist of gray-level pixels and smooth areas, are amenable to effective compression [2] . Second, existing 2D videos can be converted to 3D videos based on DIBR technique, and the 3D videos synthesized in this manner costs are much lower because they do not need different cameras to capture video frames from various viewpoints.
Different from protecting traditional 2D videos, both the 2D-video and depth-map components of DIBR-based 3D videos are very important and should be well protected. For the 3D videos synthesized from the existing 2D videos, the generators of 2D-video and depth-map components are possibly different. In this situation, the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components should better be protected independently. Otherwise, they should be protected simultaneously. In addition, noting that the attackers could record original or synthesized 2D videos for illegal distribution, the copyright ownership should be able to be verified from the synthesized videos after the DIBR rendering, which is not essential for traditional 2D videos.
Digital watermarking is an effective technique for copyright protection of 3D video and the existing watermark schemes can be divided into three main categories, which are 2D videobased watermark schemes [3] - [11] , depth map-based watermark schemes [12] - [15] and zero-watermark scheme [16] .
The 2D video-based watermark schemes [3] - [11] utilize the characteristics of depth maps to achieve remarkable watermark robustness and imperceptibility. Lee et al. [3] proposed a scheme utilizing the areas with high motion on z-axis and the pixels to be hidden by rendering for watermark embedding to enhance the watermark imperceptibility. Fan et al. [4] proposed another scheme, in which depth-perceptual regions of interest (DP-ROI) is constructed by integrating the foreground region, the depth-edge region and the gray-contour region to achieve better watermark imperceptibility. For these schemes, the watermark can be hardly extracted from the synthesized 2D videos, because the synchronism of watermark embedding and extracting is destroyed during the DIBR process. To address this issue, lots of robust watermark schemes based on shift invariance transform are designed [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] . Lin et al. [7] proposed a robustness watermark scheme, in which multiple watermarks are embedded and the effects of watermarkembedding order are studied. Kim et al. [8] proposed a scheme by quantizing the coefficients of a dual-tree complex wavelet transform (DT-CWT) to make use of the approximate shift invariance and directional selectivity of DT-CWT. Asikuzzaman et al. [9] also proposed another DT-CWT based scheme, in which the watermark is embedded in the chrominance channels of 2D video frames to achieve stronger robustness. Cui et al. [10] proposed a scheme based on histogram shape, in which suitable groups of pixel histogram are selected based on the mean value of pixels for watermark embedding. Ali et al. [11] proposed a watermark scheme based on mathematical transforms, in which the discrete wavelet transform (DWT) and the singular value decomposition (SVD) are utilized to provide complementary robustness against watermarking attacks.
However, there are three problems of 2D video-based watermark schemes. First, they introduce some irreversible distortions to the video content [15] which effects the 3D viewing experiences. Second, they only embed watermarks into the 2D videos without considering the situation that generators of 2D-video and depth-map components of 3D videos may be different. Therefore, they cannot protect the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components independently. Finally, they have to embed watermarks into the 3D videos before the video distribution. Otherwise, the copyrights of distributed 3D videos cannot be protected through watermarking [17] .
The depth map-based watermark schemes [12] - [15] restrict the modifications of depth maps below a certain threshold to keep the synthesized 3D videos undistorted and can provide better 3D viewing experiences than 2D video-based watermark schemes. Lin et al. [12] and Pei et al. [13] , [14] proposed several watermark schemes based on the unseen visible watermark (UVW) technique [18] , [19] . In these schemes, the synthesized 3D videos are undistorted under normal viewing conditions and meaningful watermarks can be recognized under non-normal DIBR conditions. However, these watermarks are only viewable for subjective copyright identification and can hardly be extracted for objective copyright identification. In addition, the watermark-embedding strength is determined based on prior estimates to restrict the modifications of depth maps in these schemes. Unfortunately, the utilization of prior estimates limits the selection of watermark-embedding methods and thus weakens the watermark robustness. To address these two issue, Liu et al. [15] proposed an advanced unseen extractable watermark (AUEW) scheme. In this scheme, watermarks are embedded by quantizing the sum of AC coefficients in the pseudo 3D-DCT domain and can be directly extracted for objective copyright identification. Moreover, simulations of embedding process rather than prior estimates are utilized to restrict the modifications of depth maps which achieves a better trade-off between watermark robustness and imperceptibility.
However, there are also some problems of depth map-based watermark schemes. First, their robustness against severe signal processing attacks or geometrical attacks is insufficient [16] . Second, they only embed watermarks into the depth maps but and thus cannot protect the copyrights of 2D-video and depthmap components independently. Third, they cannot extract any copyright information from the synthesized 2D videos without the depth map. Finally, they have to embed watermarks into the 3D videos before the video distribution [17] , which is the same with 2D video-based watermark schemes.
To address the problems with 2D video-based and depth map-based watermark schemes, Liu et al. [16] proposed a robust zero-watermark scheme for 3D video (RZW3D). In this scheme, the master shares are first generated by binarizing the 2D-DCT coefficients of temporally informative representative images (TIRI) of 2D videos and depth maps. Then, the ownership shares are generated based on (2,2) VSS and stored for copyright identification instead of directly embedding watermarks into the video content. The copyrights of a queried 3D video are recovered by stacking the master shares and ownership shares. Therefore, the zero-watermark scheme can avoid content-distortion and watermark-embedding limitations. Moreover, by utilizing the robust features of both 2D-video and depth-map components, not only the robustness of zerowatermark scheme against various attacks can be ensured, but also the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components can be identified independently and simultaneously to satisfy the different DRM requirements of DIBR-based 3D videos However, there are still two problems of this zero-watermark scheme. First, the RZW3D is based on the premise that the ownership share relevant to a particular video has been already obtained before copyright identification. Otherwise, the copyright of this video cannot be identified correctly and the verification of an illegal copy would fail. Unfortunately, because the extract features are not stored for similarity-based retrieval and no matching mechanism is designed in the zerowatermark scheme, it is difficult to obtain the precise ownership shares when processing numerous videos. Second, the robustness of RZW3D against geometrical attacks still needs improvements.
We notice that the zero-watermark scheme is more suitable for protecting the copyright of 3D videos, and its first problem can be overcome by fusing the similarity-based retrieval function while its second problem can be addressed by designing geometric invariant features. Therefore, in this study, a novel zero-watermark scheme with similarity-based retrieval for DRM of 3D video (RZW-SR3D) is proposed. In this scheme, a similarity-based retrieval phase is designed and fused into the algorithm architecture of traditional zero-watermark. The features of 2D-video and depth-map components are first extracted for similarity-based retrieval and master share generation. Then, the master shares and ownership shares are generated based on these features and the watermark information according to the (2,2) visual secret sharing scheme (VSS). The extracted features and their relevant ownership shares are stored in databases and injective index relationships between them are established. For a queried 3D video, the similarity-based retrieval phase is first executed in which the features of its 2D-video and depth-map components are extracted and compared with the stored features, which is not included in the traditional zero-watermark schemes. If any match occurs, the master shares of its 2D-video and depth-map components are generated by binarizing the extracted features for copyright identification. Finally, the copyright ownership of the illegal 3D video is identified by stacking the generated master shares with the ownership shares obtained according to the retrieval results.
The key points of RZW-SR3D are as follows: 1) To the best of our knowledge, the proposed RZW-SR3D is the first scheme that fuses similarity-based retrieval with traditional zero-watermark techniques together for protecting 3D videos. In RZW-SR3D, there is no content distortion or watermark-embedding limitation during the overall procedures of RZW-SR3D, which cannot be achieved by 2D video-based or depth map-based watermark schemes. In addition, the ownership share relevant to a particular 3D video can be obtained precisely and reliably for copyright identification when processing numerous videos based on similarity-based retrieval, which cannot be achieved by traditional zerowatermark scheme.
2) To ensure the accuracy and reliability of copyright identification. Robust and discriminative features of 2D-video and depth-map components are extracted as features. In our study, the temporally informative representative images (TIRI) are first generated to exploit temporal properties of 3D videos for enhancing the feature robustness against noise addition and temporal attacks. Then, the normalized deviations between the pixels in TIRIs and original video frames are calculated to achieve a good trade-off between feature robustness and distinguishability. Meanwhile, by using these calculated normalized deviations, the feature robustness against contrast modifications, brightness modifications and gamma-transform attacks are also enhanced. Next, the normalized deviations are partitioned into a central circle with concentric rings to enhance feature robustness against logo insertion, cropping, rotation and flipping attacks. Finally, the centroids of different partitions are calculated and normalized to construct the features.
3) To consider the different DRM requirements of 3D videos, flexible copyright-identification mechanisms are designed for both the similarity-based retrieval and copyright identification. When the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components are different, they are retrieved separately based on their own features and their copyrights are identified independently by utilizing their recovered watermarks. Otherwise, not only their retrieval results but also their copyright-identification results are fused following an attention-based decision fusion method [20] . In this manner, the complementarities of 2D-video and depth-map components are utilized to enhance the performances of similarity-based retrieval and copyright identification.
4) In RZW-SR3D, the copyright information is recovered based on the extracted feature of video frames but not based on watermark embedding and extracting in RZW-SR3D. Because the similarity among the features extracted from the original 2D videos and synthesized 2D videos, the synthesized videos can be retrieved effectively and their copyright ownership can be identified reliably.
Our experimental results demonstrate that the RZW-SR3D have remarkable DRM performances: 1) the ownership shares relevant to a particular 3D video are obtained precisely and reliably under various video attacks, 2) the copyrights of both 2D-video and depth-map components are identified reliably, independently and simultaneously without any potential copyright dissension, video distortion or watermark-embedding limitation, 3) the accuracies and reliabilities of both retrieval and copyright identification functions are sufficient even when utilizing the synthesized 2D videos after DIBR process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the proposed RZW-SR3D is described in detail. The experiment results and analyses are presented in Section III, and the conclusions are presented in Section IV.
II. PROPOSED SCHEME The proposed scheme includes three phases, which are the copyright-registration phase, similarity-based retrieval phase, and copyright-identification phase. In the copyright-registration phase, the feature and ownership-share databases of both 2D video and depth-map components are constructed from their features and relative watermark information, as shown in Fig.  1 . When a 3D video is queried, the similarity-based retrieval phase is executed to find the stored features that match the features extracted from the queried video, as shown in Fig. 2 . If any matched feature is found, the 3D video is considered an illegal copy and the copyright-identification phase is executed to identify the copyright ownership of the illegal copy, as shown in Fig. 3 .
A. Copyright-registration phase 1) Generation of TIRI
TIRI is a weighted average of the video frames, which exploits the temporal information of the video sequence [21] . Its mathematical definition is shown in (1):
where Fm is the m th video frame, wm is the weight associated with Fm, L is the total number of frames in the video sequence, and a is between 0 and 1. When a is close to 1, the generated TIRI is similar to an averaged image and contains more temporal information, which is more robust. Otherwise, the generated TIRI will contain more spatial information and less temporal information, which is more discriminative. Because TIRI contains both the spatial and temporal information of a short video sequence, it is utilized in RZW-SR3D for the feature extraction to enhance the feature robustness against noise addition and temporal attacks. In our study, a is selected to be 1. In this manner, the generated TIRI contains more temporal information and thus the feature robustness is stronger.
2) Feature extraction
In our study, the same feature-extraction mechanisms of 2D-video and depth-map components are designed, which reduces the computational costs based on the reuse benefits. Both the 2D video and depth-map components are first smoothed and resized in the spatial domain. Then, TIRIs of these resized frames are constructed. After that, the TIRI-based deviation frames are generated and normalized. Next, the normalized TIRI-based deviation frames are partitioned into concentric rings. Finally, the centroids of partitions in the normalized TIRI-based deviation frames are calculated to generate the final features. The procedure of feature extraction is shown in Fig. 4 and listed below.
Step 1. Fix the frame sizes of both the 2D-video and depthmap components, from w × h× l to 320 × 320 × 100 based on spatial and temporal smoothing. Here, w and h are the width and height of the original video frame, respectively. l is the frame number of the 3D video clip. Select the luminance components of the resized 2D videos and depth maps, denoted as R2d and Rdepth for feature extraction. In this manner, the robustness of extracted features against the resizing attack can be ensured. Step 2. Subsample and average R2d and Rdepth in the temporal domain to construct their TIRIs, denoted as TIRI2d and TIRIdepth, respectively, in (2). 
where c (2d, depth), TIRI2d (i, j) and TIRIdepth(i, j) are the pixels in the i th row and j th column of the 2D-video and depth-map TIRIs, respectively. R2d(i, j, k) and Rdepth(i, j, k) are the pixels in the i th row and j th column of the k th frame of the resized 2D video and depth map; 1≤i≤320,1≤j≤320,1≤ m≤ 20 and M =20.
Step 3. Generate TIRI-based deviation frames D2d (i, j, k) and Ddepth(i, j, k) by calculating the maximal absolute differences between pixels in resized frames and their 8 spatial neighborhood pixels in the TIRIs, as shown in (3). Only their relative positions are modified, which does not affect the maximal absolute differences calculated in (3). Therefore, the utilization of 8 spatial-neighborhood pixels rather than the horizontal and vertical neighbors enhances the robustness against rotation and flipping attacks.
The pixels in TIRIs rather than those in single resized frames are utilized as the neighborhood pixels to exploit temporal properties of video sequences, which enhances the feature robustness against noise addition and temporal attacks. The pixels in single resized frames rather than those in TIRIs are utilized as central pixels to exploit more detailed spatial properties of video sequences, which enhances the feature distinguishability.
Step 4. Normalize the TIRI-based deviation frames and generate the normalized frames, denoted as N2d (i, j, k) and Ndepth
where c (2d, depth). In this manner, the feature robustness against global attacks such as contrast modification, brightness modification and gamma transform is enhanced.
Step 5. Partition the normalized frames into a central circle and N-1 concentric rings. The radius of the central circle and the widths of concentric rings are set to r, as shown in Fig. 6 . For each pixel (i, j, k) in the k th frame, its distance Dist(i, j, k) to the center point of this frame (io, jo, k) is first calculated as shown in (5). 
In our study, the size of the normalized deviation frames is 320320, N is equal to 16, r is equal to 10. When the videos are rotated or flipped, the pixels partitioned in this manner still belong to their original associated circle or ring partitions. Therefore, the feature robustness against rotation and flipping attacks is ensured. In addition, the regions outside the largest ring, which are shown as dark regions in Fig. 6 , are not utilized in our study due to the following two reasons. On one hand, the main visual components of a video frame are usually concentrated in its central region, and the importance of a component increases as its distance to the frame center decreases in common cases. Therefore, the features generated by discarding these dark regions do not lose much important visual information. On the other hand, because these regions are the most common places for logo insertion and cropping attacks, the feature robustness against these attacks can be enhanced by discarding the dark regions.
Step 6. Calculate the centroid of each partition in the normalized deviation frame using (7) and generate the intermediate features of 2D-video and depth-map components, denoted as f2d and fdepth, using (8).
( 1) ( , , ) 
where c (2d, depth), K is the number of normalized TIRIbased deviation frames. In our study, K is equal to 100 and the dimensionality of f2d and fdepth is KN equal to 1600.
Step 7. Normalize the intermediate features by their mean and standard deviation as shown in (9) to generate the final features, fn2d and fndepth. Store fn2d and fndepth in the 2D-video and depth-map feature databases, respectively, for similarity-based retrieval. Here, c (2d, depth). 3) Generation of the master share and the ownership share (m, n) VSS (where m ≤ n) was proposed by Naor et al. [22] . 
Nr r
In VSS, one binary image is split into n shares, and can be recovered from l shares when l ≥ m. Otherwise, the image cannot be recovered. The (2, 2) VSS is a typical VSS, in which each pixel of a binary image is substituted by a pair of shares consisting of four sub-pixels. A white pixel is split into two identical shares, whereas a black pixel is split into two complementary shares, as shown in Table 1. (2-2) VSS is a low-cost injective function and utilized in our RZW-SR3D to generate the master shares and ownership shares. In this manner, the mapping relationships between features and copyright information is injective. Therefore, the robustness and distinguishability of features can be maintained during the procedure of generating master shares and ownership shares to achieve remarkable DRM performance. The detailed procedure is listed below.
Step where c (2d, depth), m2d (i, j) and mdepth (i, j) are nonoverlapping 2 × 2 blocks of M2d and Mdepth; 1≤i≤40 and 1≤j≤40.
Step 3. Generate ownership shares of 2D-video and depth-map components, which are denoted as O2d and Odepth, according to the (2, 2) VSS as shown in (12). 
where, c(2d, depth), o2d (i, j) and odepth (i, j) are non-
Step 4. Store the generated O2d and Odepth in the ownership databases for the copyright-identification phase and establish injective index relationships between the extracted features and their relevant ownership shares.
B. Similarity-based retrieval phase
When a 3D video is queried, the features of its 2D-video and depth-map components, which are denoted as fn'2d and fn'depth, are first extracted following the same procedure in the copyright-registration phase. Then, the normalized distances between the queried features and the original features in databases are measured as shown in (13). where c(2d, depth), N is the number of partitions and equal to 16, and K is the number of frames and equal to 100.
To satisfy the different DRM requirements of DIBR-based 3D videos, a flexible matching mechanism is designed in our study.
In the case that the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components are different, the features of 2D-video and depthmap components are matched separately and independently. Given the thresholds T2d and Tdepth, if any d2d or ddepth is smaller than T2d or Tdepth, respectively, the 2D videos or depth maps of two 3D videos are considered as near-duplicates and the queried 3D video is considered as illegal.
Otherwise, the normalized distances of 2D-video features and depth-map features are fused. It will be better if the function FD satisfies the heterogeneity and monotonicity for distance fusion, which are defined in (14) -(15), respectively.
are distance values to be fused.
.
where 0 < ε ≤ d1 ≤ d2; d1, d2 are distance values to be fused. To strictly satisfy (14) and (15) simultaneously, an attentionbased decision fusion function for distances is designed inspired by the method [20] as below. 
whereγis a constant and is set to 0.1 empirically in our study. Given a threshold Tfusion, the two 3D videos are considered near-duplicates and the queried 3D video is considered as illegal if any distance value fused by FD is smaller than Tfusion.
Because the 2D videos have more texture information than the depth maps whereas the distribution of pixel values in the depth maps is regional, the robustnesses of 2D-video and depthmap features are complementary to a certain extent. Therefore, the distance fused in (18) further enhances the reliability of similarity-based retrieval against different attacks. If the queried 3D video is considered as illegal, the copyrightidentification phase is implemented. Otherwise, the procedure of RZW-SR3D is finished.
C. Copyright-identification phase
In this phase, the ownership shares relevant to the matched features are utilized along with the master shares which are generated from the illegal 3D videos to recover the copyright information. The detailed procedure is listed below.
1) Recovery of copyright information
Step 1. Obtain the ownership shares relevant to the matched features from ownership databases.
Step 2. Generate the master shares of illegal 3D videos, M'2d and M'depth, from f'2d and f'depth, respectively, following the same procedure in the copyright-registration phase.
Step 3. Stack the generated master shares with the obtained ownership shares to construct intermediate copyrightidentification matrices S2d and Sdepth, as shown in Table 1 .
Step 4. 
where c(2d,depth); 
ij depth s x y are nonoverlapping 2×2 blocks of S2d and Sdepth; 1≤i≤40, 1≤j≤40, 1≤x≤2, and 1≤y≤2.
2) Identification of copyright ownership
To satisfy the different DRM requirements of DIBR-based 3D videos, a flexible copyright-identification mechanism is designed in our study.
In the case that the copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components are different, they are identified separately and independently by calculating their own bit error rates (BER) between the original watermark information and the recovered watermark information as shown in (18 
where c(2d, depth),1≤i≤40 and 1≤j≤40. Otherwise, the BER values of 2D-video and depth-map components are fused. It will be better if the function FBER satisfies the heterogeneity and monotonicity for BER fusion, which are similar with distance fusion. Therefore, a similar attention-based decision fusion function for BER is also designed as below, 
whereγis a constant and is set to 0.1 empirically in our study. The attention-based decision fusion further enhances the reliability of copyright identification because the robustnesses of 2D-video and depth-map features are complementary as analyzed in the similarity-based retrieval phase.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Experimental Setup
In this section, the performances of similarity-based retrieval in RZW-SR3D are first evaluated in part B. Then, the performances of copyright identification in RZW-SR3D are evaluated in part C. Others consist of 2D video clips selected from existing movies, with their depth maps manually calibrated based on the method in [25] . The frame sizes of 'Interview', 'Dancer', 'Ballet' and the manually calibrated video clips are ranged from 720 × 576, to 1920 × 1080, respectively. Each video clip contains 100 2D-video frames and 100 depth-map frames. A watermark image of size 40 × 40 is utilized for copyright identification. Four sequences of synthesized 2D video clips are generated by set the baseline distances as 5% and 7% of the video frame width. These baseline distances have been chosen carefully since baseline distance ratios larger than 7% may induce discomfort for 3D viewing whereas smaller baseline distance lead to traditional 2D viewing.
All the original 2D video clips, depth-maps and synthesized 2D video clips suffer 14 types of attacks with different parameters. A total of 5200 (200×26) attacked original 2D video clips, 5200 attacked depth-maps and 21600 (4×200×27) attacked synthesized 2D video clips are generated as the queried videos to evaluate performances of the retrieval and copyright identification functions of RZW-SR3D. The types and parameters of the attacks are shown in 
B. Evaluation of the similarity-based retrieval performance
The performance of similarity-based retrieval is evaluated by calculating the false-negative rate Pfns with the fixed falsepositive rate Pfps under all these attacks. Pfp is a probability of classifying different videos as the same and indicates the feature distinguishability, whereas Pfn is a probability of classifying similar videos as different and indicates the feature robustness. Pfp and Pfn are defined by (21)- (22) . where Nfp is the number of different video-clip pairs whose Hamming distance is smaller than a threshold, Ndis is the true number of different video clips, Nfn is the number of similar clip pairs whose Hamming distance is larger than the threshold, and Ns is the true number of similar video clips.
First, the performances of similarity-based retrieval in our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing the original 2D videos, utilizing the depth maps and fusing them together are tested on all the 3D videos in our databases. The results are listed in Table  3 . Table 3 shows that all the Pfns of our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing original 2D videos, utilizing depth maps and fusing them together are very small, with the maximal values as 0.0350, 0.1450, 0.0250, and the average values as 0.0067, 0.0412, 0.0029. These results demonstrate that the similaritybased retrieval of our proposed RZW-SR3D is effective. In addition, Pfns obtained when fusing the two components together are even smaller than those obtained when only utilizing original 2D videos or depth maps, which demonstrate that the attention-based decision fusion enhances the performances of similarity-based retrieval. The reason for this phenomenon is that the feature robustnesses of 2D-video and depth-map components are complementary because 2D videos have more texture information whereas depth maps consist of gray pixels, of which the values are distributed regionally.
Then, the performances of similarity-based retrieval in our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing the synthesized 2D videos, and fusing them with their depth maps are also tested in Table  4 . Table 4 shows that all the Pfns of our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing synthesized 2D videos are still very small, with the maximal values as 0.0500, 0.0600, 0.0550, 0.0750 respectively, and the average values as 0.0092, 0.0079, 0.0189, 0.0114. Especially, for the synthesized 2D videos without attacks, their Pfns are 0.0000, 0.0000, 0.0100 and 0.0000. These results demonstrate that the similarity-based retrieval of our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing synthesized 2D videos is still effective although it is slightly worse than utilizing original 2D videos. The reason for this phenomenon is the similarity among the features extracted from the original 2D videos and synthesized 2D videos. In addition, Pfns obtained when fusing the synthesized 2D video clips and depth maps are still smaller than those when only utilizing synthesized 2D videos or depth maps, with their maximal values as 0.0300, 0.0400, 0.0350, 0.0500 and their average values as 0.0035, 0.0042,0.0046, and 0.0052, which is consistent with the results listed in Table 3 Finally, we plot a detection error tradeoff (DET) graphs of RZW-SR3D, as shown in Fig.10 , to fully demonstrate the performance of similarity-based retrieval. Fig.9 shows that . In addition, all the DET graphs fusing the 2D-video and depth-map components are close or below the graphs when only utilizing 2D video or depth map respectively. These results demonstrate that both the accuracy and the reliability of the similarity-based retrieval in RZW-SR3D are sufficient and enhanced by designing the attention-based decision fusion.
Because injective index relationships between the features and ownership shares are established, the ownership share relevant to a particular 3D video can be also obtained precisely and reliably according to similarity-based retrieval results for the latter copyright identification phase.
C. Evaluation of the copyright-identification performance
The performance of copyright identification is mainly in terms of accuracy and reliability. Because only the 3D video which exists matching features would enter the copyrightidentification phase, the accuracy of copyright identification has been ensured in the similarity-based retrieval phase by setting Pfps to 0.01. Therefore, we mainly evaluate the reliability of copyright identification by using our proposed RZW-SR3D in this section.
First, the subjective evaluation is performed. The recovered watermark images in our proposed RZW-SR3D for one of the typical 3D video clips, which is 'Interview' are compared with those detected by UVW [14] and AUEW [15] . The results are shown in Tables 5. RZW3D [16] is not included in the subjective evaluation because the copyright information in RZW3D is the features of watermark images rather than the watermark images themselves, which can hardly be recognized subjectively.
As shown in Tables 5, the watermarks recovered from the original 2D videos, depth maps, and synthesized 2D videos by Fig. 10 . DET graph of the proposed RZW-SR3D, (a) utilizing original 2D videos, depth maps and them together (b) utilizing synthesized 2D videos (baseline=5%), depth maps and them together (c) utilizing synthesized 2D videos (baseline=7%), depth maps and them together using RZW-SR3D can be recognized successfully under all the attacks for the explicit copyright identifications. In addition, they are much clearer than those detected by the other two schemes. The watermarks in UVW are viewable but can be hardly extracted. Moreover, the watermarks in the UVW cannot be easily recognized under filtering, noise addition, severe resizing and rotation attacks. Meanwhile, the extracted watermarks in AUEW cannot be easily recognized under severe filtering, heavy noise addition, rotation and flipping attacks. These results demonstrate that our proposed RZW-SR3D can identify the copyright explicitly and reliably under various attacks and outperforms the other two watermark schemes in terms of the watermark robustness.
To further evaluate the copyright-identification reliability of our proposed RZW-SR3D, objective evaluation is then performed.
We first calculate the BERs between the original watermark and recovered watermarks when utilizing original 2D videos, utilizing depth maps and fusing the two components together.
The results are compared with that of AUEW and those of RZW3D, as shown in Table 6 . UVW is not included in the subjective evaluation because the watermarks in the UVWbased ones are only viewable but can be hardly extracted for objective evaluation. Table 6 shows that the mean BERs of our proposed RZW-SR3D when utilizing original 2D videos, utilizing depth maps and fusing them together are very small and their maximal values are 0.1783, 0.1700 and 0.0870, respectively. These values are smaller than the maximal value of AUEW, which is 0.5873, and those of RZW3D, which are 0.4981, 0.4942 and 0.4772, respectively. The average values of the mean BERs of our proposed RZW-SR3D are merely 0.0619, 0.0628, and 0.0287, respectively. These values are also much smaller than that of AUEW, which is 0.1744, and those of RZW3D, which are 0.1308, 0.1706 and 0.1185. Especially, the mean BERs of RZW-SR3D are much smaller than those of AUEW under severe filtering, heavy noise addition, rotation, and flipping attacks. Meanwhile, the mean BERs of RZW-SR3D are much smaller than those of RZW3D under logo insertion, cropping, rotation, and flipping attacks. These results demonstrate that the copyright-identification reliability of RZW-SR3D is sufficient against all the tested attacks and much more reliable than those of AUEW and RZW3D. As analyzed in the method section, the sufficient robustness of RZW-SR3D against the severe filtering and heavy noise-addition attacks is due to the utilization of the centroid of TIRI-based deviation frame, while the sufficient robustness of RZW-SR3D against the logo insertion, cropping, rotation and flipping attacks is due to the utilization of the concentric-based partitions and the deviations between the center pixels and their 8 spatial-neighborhood pixels.
In addition, Table 6 demonstrates that the BERS when fusing the two components together are even smaller than those when only utilizing the 2D videos or depth maps, which demonstrates that attention-based decision fusion enhances the copyrightidentification performance. The reason for this phenomenon is also due to utilization of the complementary feature robustnesses of 2D-video and depth-map components, as analyzed in the evaluation of the performance of similaritybased retrieval.
Then, we calculate the BERs between the original watermark and recovered watermarks when utilizing the synthesized 2D videos, and fusing them with their depth maps. The result are shown in Table 7  Table 7 show that BERs when utilizing the synthesized 2D videos are still very small with the maximal value as 0. Table 6 .
D. Qualitative comparisons with current state-of-the-art schemes
In this experiment, qualitative comparisons with other watermark schemes, zero-watermark scheme and feature schemes are conducted in terms of seven aspects: 1) the reliability of the copyright identification, 2) the accuracy of the copyright identification, 3) the distortion of 3D video, 4) the limitation of watermark embedding, 5) the involvement of similarity-based retrieval mechanism, 6) the independence of the copyrights of the 2D-video and depth-map components, and 7) the requirement of additional storage. The comparison results are shown in Table 8 .
As shown in Table 8 , our proposed RZW-SR3D outperforms other state-of-the-art schemes in terms of the first 6 aspects.
In contrast to 2D video based watermark schemes [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] , RZW-SR3D does not directly embed watermark information into 2D videos, which avoids introducing distortion into the 3D videos and watermark embedding limitations. Compared with the depth map-based watermark schemes [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] , RZW-SR3D is more robust against various video attacks and can thus provide more reliable copyright identification. In addition, RZW-SR3D does not directly embed any watermark information the depth maps, which ensures better watermarking imperceptibility and avoids watermark embedding limitations.
In contrast to the RZW3D [14] , RZW-SR3D designs an effective similarity-based retrieval mechanism for 3D videos and their relevant ownership can be obtained precisely according to the retrieval results. Therefore, the accuracy of copyright identification in RZW-SR3D are ensured when processing numerous videos.
More importantly, the existing scheme has rarely considered the possibility that the copyrights of the 2D-video and depthmap components of synthesized 3D videos may be different. In this situation, their copyrights should better be protected independently. Only the RZW3D [14] and RZW-SR3D have designed flexible mechanisms for copyright identification and utilized the features of the 2D-video and depth-map components separately to satisfy this special DRM requirement of 3D videos.
In 2D video and depth map-based watermark schemes, the copyright information is directly embedded into the 2D video frames or depth maps. On the contrary, in RZW-SR3D, there is no watermark information directly embedded into the 2D video frames or depth maps, which is the same with RZW3D and other zero-watermarking schemes. Therefore, the 2D video-based and depth map-based watermark schemes do not need any additional storage, whereas the RZW-SR3D requires additional 160 bits, which is not large, for the stored features and ownership shares of each 3D video frame. Although the RZW-SR3D is not as good as 2D video-based and depth map-based schemes in terms of the additional storage, its additional storage cost is acceptable when considering its superiority on the other 6 aspects of DRM performance.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a novel RZW-SR3D is proposed by fusing the similarity-based retrieval technique and the zero-watermark technique. Our analytical and experimental results have demonstrated that our proposed RZW-SR3D achieves significant robustness against various global, geometrical and temporal attacks by utilizing the centroids of concentric-based partitions in the TIRI-based deviation frames. Moreover, our proposed RZW-SR3D possesses the following merits. First, RZW-SR3D does not directly embed the copyright information into the 3D videos. Therefore, RZW-SR3D can avoid content distortion and watermark-embedding limitation, which is an improvement over the other 2D video-based and depth mapbased watermark schemes for protecting 3D videos [3] - [15] . Second, RZW-SR3D designs an effective similarity-based retrieval mechanism, and the ownership relevant to 3D videos can be obtained precisely and reliably even when processing numerous videos, which cannot be achieved by the RZW3D [16] . Finally, the proposed scheme separates the features and copyrights of 2D-video and depth-map components. In this manner, 2D-video and depth-map components of 3D videos can be retrieved and their copyrights can be protected independently and simultaneously, which better satisfies the different DRM requirements of 3D videos compared to most existing schemes for protecting 3D videos [3] - [15] .
